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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
including such searches carried out in spite of the violent resistance of the
person searched."
'76
The total effect of the Huguez decision is one of tighter restrictions on
border officials in the area of body cavity searches. Not only will the customs
agents have to show substantial evidence to back up the initiation of any
such search in the future, but they will have to handle the suspect in an
extremely gentle manner. Also, the agents will have to take more care to
pass on all information and suspicions they have to the physician before he
attempts any medical examination.
Whether this will result in additional protection for innocent travelers
or simply in the reversal of more narcotics convictions remains to be seen.
That the rule of exclusion and reversal results in the escape of guilty persons is
more capable of demonstration than that it deters invasions of right by the
police. . . . Rejection of the evidence does nothing to punish the wrong-doing
official, while it may, and likely will, release the wrong-doing defendant. . . . It
protects one against whom incriminating evidence is discovered, but does nothing
to protect innocent persons who are the victims of illegal but fruitless searches. 77
Janetta Fowler
76 Henderson v. United States, supra note 16, at 806-07.
77 Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1953).
CRIMINAL LAW-GUIDELINES FOR EXPERT TESTIMONY IN
THE INSANITY DEFENSE-MAKING THE
"PRODUCT" PALPABLE
A jury convicted Thomas Washington, appellant, of rape, robbery and
assault with a deadly weapon. The principal defense was insanity. The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that
sufficient evidence had been adduced to preclude a directed verdict. However,
the court went on to criticize the quality of the evidence and wrote a model
instruction setting forth guidelines for future testimony by expert witnesses
on the insanity defense in criminal prosecutions. Washington v. United States,
390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
The Washington case presents an interesting intertwining of criminal law
substantive and evidentiary issues. The general scope of the opinion en-
compasses the insanity defense to criminal responsibility. Specifically, Chief
Judge Bazelon, who wrote the opinion of the court, adjudged the role of
psychiatric expert opinion testimony. But equally noteworthy are the impli-
cations of his expositive opinion, which typify the struggle courts are having
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with the insanity defense. Can behavioral scientific knowledge, which neces-
sarily begins with a deterministic premise, be adapted to the present system
of criminal justice, which operates upon the premise that most men freely
will their acts? Can a determination of criminal responsibility in the individ-
ual case be made? Although the Washington court assumed the affirmative
to both these questions in rendering its decision, Judge Bazelon, by way of
obiter dicta, questioned the validity of those assumptions.
In affirming Washington's conviction, the court accepted appellant's chal-
lenge "to settle once and for all the proper role of labels and conclusions in
insanity cases."1 While the court felt it could not disturb the fact determina-
tion of the jury, it should ensure that future verdicts be based on relevant,
meaningful evidence. Washington v. United States was thus used as the means
for elucidation on the role of the psychiatric expert witness in a criminal
trial.
In order to understand what the court saw as the psychiatrist's proper
function, a review of the history of the insanity defense in the District of
Columbia is necessary.
Prior to 1954, insanity sufficient to negate capacity to form the requisite
mens rea was tested by the formula in M'Naghten's Case' coupled with
the "irresistible impulse" test.3 The M'Naghten Rule read:
Every man is to be presumed to be sane, and ... to establish a defense on
the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the
committing of the act, the party accused was labouing under such a defect of
reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act
he was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was
wrong. 4
The "irresistible impulse" test added "that if his reasoning powers were so far
dethroned by his diseased mental condition as to deprive him of the will
power to resist the insane impulse to perpetrate the deed, though knowing
it to be wrong," the accused should then also be acquitted.5'
Using the term "disease of the mind" had the significant effect of making
expert medical testimony highly relevant, whereas, prior to that time, the
jury had evaluated the evidence without any such assistance. 6 Psychiatrists
1 Reply Brief for Appellant at 3, Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444 (D.C.
Cir. 1967).
2 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
3 Smith v. United States, 36 F.2d 548 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
4 M'Naghten's Case, supra note 2, at 722.
5 Supra note 3, at 549. The M'Naghten Rule with or without the "irresistible impulse"
test remains the law in many jurisdictions today.
6 Prior to M'Naghten, the test had been whether defendant "doth not know what he is
doing, no more than . . . a wild beast." GLUECK, MENTArL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL
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were called upon to illuminate defendant's mental state at the time of the
crime. Usually the inquiry was limited to the narrow scope of the test ques-
tions. However these tests were widely criticized as being concerned with the
cognitive aspects of the mind to the exclusion of the emotional and volitional.7
The rule in Durham v. United States" was announced by the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals with the expectation that it would
eliminate these objections and provide meaningful facts from which the jury
could determine blameworthiness. There the court formulated the standard
"that an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the
product of mental disease or mental defect." 9 The legal test was thus broad-
ened to include whatever was the latest relevant scientific knowledge about
the insane mind. Concomitantly, it was expected of the psychiatrist that he
would fulfill his function in a manner which would allow him to employ the
full range of his expertise. He was to limit himself, however, to advisory
opinions on the clinical facts concerning the accused's mental state and avoid
moral or legal conclusions. Unfortunately, the witness' uncertain diagnostic
conclusions were too readily received as conclusive of the legal issue. Accen-
tuation of the psychiatrist's greater insight regarding the defendant's mental
condition was probably responsible for this predicament, as also was the
misconception that the test was the same in both a normative and medical
sense.'
0
Despite this mistaken notion, there was a clear conception of what the
ideal psychiatric witness would provide in his testimony. The court in Carter
v. United States expected the witness to describe and explain any mental
disease in terms of how it originated, evolved and influenced the defendant's
mental and emotional processes. 1 Stress was placed on the assertion that
LAW 138-39 (1925), citing Rex v. Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr. 695, 764 (1724). Under this
rule no expert was needed.
7 See generally CARDOZO, WHAT MEDICINE CAN Do FOR THE LAW 28 et. seq. (1930);
GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1925); GUT14IACtIER & WEIHOFEN,
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 403-23 (1952); MENNINOER, THE HUMAN MIND 450 (1937);
OVERHOLSER, THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE LAW 41-43 (1953); RAY, MEDICAL JURISPRU-
DENCE OF INSANITY (1st ed. 1838) (4th ed. 1860).
8 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
9 Id. at 874-75. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 401 (Proposed Official Draft 1962): "(1)
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a
result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the
criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements
of law. (2) The terms 'mental disease or defect' do not include an abnormality manifested
only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct."
10 Evidence of this misconception can be found in the opinion of the court in Carter
v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1956): "Durham was intended to restrict
to their proper medical function the part played by the medical experts. Many psychia-
trists had come to understand there was a 'legal insanity' different from any clinical
mental illness."
1' Id. Accord, Hawkins v. United States, 310 F.2d 849, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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more important than the expert's conclusions were the reasoning and data
which formed them.
Notwithstanding such distinct directives, abuses continued in that experts
testified conclusively as to whether the defendant had a mental disease. As
a result, the same abnormal mental condition might one week have been
insufficient to exculpate the defendant, and the next week be considered to
conform to the definition.1 2 This was possible because no clearly defined
distinctions existed between what was clinically and what was legally a
mental disease.
The District of Columbia appellate court finaly recognized this semantic
confusion and in McDonald v. United States13 gave legal meaning to the
term "disease":
[A] mental disease or defect includes any abnormal condition of the mind which
substantially affects mental or emotional processes and substantially impairs be-
havior controls. 14
In addition, the court required that the jury should decide whether what the
experts said was a disease was in fact such according to the legal definition. 15
Even though the functions of the psychiatrist and the jury were sharply
delineated as to the existence of mental disease or defect, transgressions
persisted. By using pejorative scientific labels which were conclusory in effect,
the intent of the McDonald court was circumvented. 16 In the Washington
case, the court referred to the expert's testimony as often being "a confusing
mass of abstract philosophical discussion and fruitless disputation ...about
legal and psychiatric labels and jargon," and lacking in pertinent underlying
information.' 7
With the insanity defense, in general, words such as "insane," "psychotic,"
12 See, e.g., Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853 ().C. Cir. 1961) ; In re Rosenfield,
157 F. Supp. 18 (D.D.C. 1957).
13312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
14 Id. at 851. In Durham v. United States, supra note 8, at 875, "disease" was defined
as "a condition which is considered capable of either improving or deteriorating"; "de-
fect," as "a condition which is not considered capable of either improving or deteriorating
and which may be either congenital, or the result of injury, or the residual effect of a
physical or mental disease."
15 McDonald v. United States, supra note 13, at 851. This was a retrenchment from the
position in Carter v. United States, supra note 10.
16 See, e.g., Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444, 447-50 (D.C. Cir. 1967), where
the court objected to the "disputes and conclusions about medical and legal terminology-
about whether a person is 'normal' if he is not 'too neurotic,' about whether Washington
was suffering from a 'neurosis,' about whether he has a 'schizoid personality' as opposed
to 'traits of a schizoid nature,' about whether 'he has sociopathic symptomology,' or
whether instead 'he has aggressive antisocial activity .... "
17Supra note 16, at 447. See, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 360 F.2d 514, 518-21
(D.C. Cir. 1966) ; Heard v. United States, 348 F.2d 43, 50-51 (D.C. Cir. 1965) ; Rollerson
v. United States, 343 F.2d 269, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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and "schizophrenic" superabound. Scant personal history on the origin and
development of defendant's behavioral patterns ever appears in the testimony
even where lengthy psychiatric reports exist. Instead, each side presents
witnesses who use conclusive and esoteric language which is contradictory to
that used by the opposing witnesses.' 8
Noted medico-legal writers have objected to this diagnostic categorization
and have urged instead that the testimony focus on describing and making
intelligible the defendant's personality and behavior. To be meaningful and
helpful to the jury, the testimony should include information on defendant's
mental, emotional and voluntary processes; the nature of any mental disease
or defect, and the relationship of such disease or defect to the type of conduct
for which defendant has been charged; the degree of intensity with which
he has delusions and hallucinations; the extent to which he is capable of
deferring gratifications or to which he comprehends the consequences of his
actions; and, the probability that any such condition which would be relevant
to the crime charged was, in fact, influencing him at the time the crime was
committed.' 9 Labels and esoteric terminology should be avoided whenever
possible, not only because they will more likely be incomprehensible to the
jury, but because in the developing sciences of psychiatry and psychology,
they imply a precision which is non-existent. 20 An expository type of testi-
mony is also called for because of the evidentiary requirement that expert
opinion have an ascertainable basis in fact. 21
In order to obtain meaningful testimony and to preclude confusing termin-
ology, the trial judge should fulfill his role as a supervisor of the evidence by
limiting the psychiatrist's use of medical labels and by ensuring that when
these labels are used that their meaning is explained to the jury in a way
which relates to the accused.
The Washington court also discussed the legal labels, "product" and "men-
tal disease or defect," which are used in the Durham test for criminal
responsibility. Concern was expressed that these are too often used by the
witness in a legal-moral rather than medical sense with a consequent usur-
18 See GOLDSTEIN, Ti-m INSANITY DEIENSF 41 (1967). Goldstein's criticisms were aimed
at psychiatric testimony regardless of the test employed.
191d. at 26, 28, 30, 34; Salzman, Psychiatric Interviews As Evidence: The Role of
the Psychiatrist in Court-Some Suggestions and Case Histories, 30 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
853, 854-55, 858 (1962). See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, supra note 13, at 851;
Carter v. United States, supra note 10, at 617-18; Rollerson v. United States, supra note
17, at 272-73.
20 See MENNINGER, THE VITAL BALANCE 25 passim (1963) ; Salzman, supra note 19, at
859.
21 "This is merely an application of the general principle of the knowledge qualifica-
tion." 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 562 (3d ed. 1940). See McCoRaeicK, EVIDENCE 24 (1954);
UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 57.
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pation of the jury's function.22 In an attempt to obviate this practice, the
court decided to prohibit psychiatrists from testifying directly in terms of
"product," "result," or "cause." Any clinical connotation to these words was
considered inconsequential when weighed against their ordinary, and, in this
case, legal meaning. The court refrained from prohibiting testimony on
whether defendant suffered from a "mental disease or defect," even though
it too was seen as a part of the ultimate issue to be determined by the jury,
because the term might have clinical significance to the psychiatrist, and, if
prohibited, would only be replaced by other conclusory labels. Hope was
expressed that the guidelines established by the elucidation on the psychia-
trist's role would adequately prevent misuses.23
Concern with the peril in "product" testimony had been voiced five years
earlier by Judge Burger in his dissent in Campbell v. United States:2 4
[W]hen a qualified expert psychiatrist with the mantle of professional standing,
and medical degrees in a high calling, tells a jury that the act charged is not the
"product" of any "mental disease," he is stating a conclusion that the defendant
ought to be found guilty.25
In adopting this position the Washington court cited Judge Burger's admo-
nition along with several cases in the jurisdiction, beginning with United
States v. Spaulding,28 holding that an expert cannot give his opinion or
conclusion on the ultimate fact in issue.
The court made further reference to McCormick as supporting this
position. 27 McCormick, however, saw the general doctrine barring witnesses
from giving opinions on an ultimate fact in issue as going beyond the bounds
of common'sense reluctance.28
It is believed, however, that this general rule [banning opinions on the ultimate
fact issue] is unduly restrictive, is pregnant with close questions of application, and
often unfairly obstructs the party's presentation of his case. Even the courts which
profess adherence to the rule fail to apply it with consistency. All such courts,
for example, disregard the supposed rule, usually without explanation as to why it
should not be applied, when value, sanity, handwriting and identity are in issue.29
22 The functions were clearly delineated in McDonald v. United States, supra note 13.
23 Washington v. United States, supra note 16, at 454-56.
24 307 F.2d 597 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
25 Id. at 613 (Burger, J., dissenting).
26 293 U.S. 498 (1935).
27 Washington v. United States, supra note 16, at 456 n.31.
28 McCo .micK, EVIDENc E 26 (1954).
29 Id. Other authorities have discarded the rule banning ultimate issue opinion entirely.
7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1920-21 (3d ed. 1940); UNn:ORm RULE Op EVIDENCE 56 (4).
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In showing the relationship of any disease or defect to the alleged offense,
it seems absurd to draw a distinction between employing words which
establish a causal relationship and employing a word such as "product" on
the sole basis that the latter is an infringement on the ultimate fact issue
which the jury is deciding. Judge Fahy's position in the concurring opinion"0
is more reasonable and realistic.
More important, such an opinion [on the product or causal issue] does not relate
to a matter of common knowledge or observation as to which the expert in
psychiatry does not often have knowledge superior to that of the "lay or unedu-
cated mind." True it is that the jury of laymen must form a judgment on the issue
of criminal responsibility, but this does not bar from the jury such assistance in
forming that judgment as a person specially qualified by education and experience
in psychiatry might afford.31
The Washington court is probably correct in citing McCormick as sup-
porting the barring of psychiatrists from speaking directly in "product"
terms. However, the reason would not merely be that there is an opinion on
the ultimate issue. More probably it would be due to the use of the exact
word which is a part of the legal test. Nothing is added to the jury's under-
standing and the word creates a "substantial danger of undue prejudice.13 2
Furthermore, regarding the "product" and "disease" labels, many psychia-
trists feel that they have no more expertise than laymen to make these
conclusionary determinations. They see the criteria as involving primarily
moral considerations. In addition, they do not feel capable of making diag-
nostic statements which are scientifically certain about the defendant's mental
state.38 To answer in terms of the test questions might reinforce any misin-
30 Washington v. United States, supra note 16, at 461 (Fahy, J., concurring specially in
affirmance).
31 Washington v. United States, supra note 16, at 461. Accord, United States Smelting
Co. v. Parry, 166 F. 417, 411 (8th Cir. 1908).
32 McCoRmiC]K, supra note 28, at 27; UNiropR RULE oi' EVIDENCE 45.
33 See Guttmacher, The Psychiatrist As An Expert Witness, 22 U. Cm. L. Rv. 325, 327
(1955): "[Tihere will at times be doubt as to whether or not the act was the product of
the existing mental abnormality." MENNINGER, THE VITAL BALANCE 25, 33 (1963): "This
trend in diagnosis away from the concept of understanding the afflicted individual and
back toward the goal of identifying and tabulating 'the disease' seems regressive and
archaic to us. It implies a precision of findings and a conformity of pathology which do
not-in our opinion-exist .... To refer to a constellation of symptoms as constituting
a schizophrenic picture is very different from referring to the individual presenting these
symptoms as a victim of 'schizophrenia' or as being a 'schizophrenic.' Some symptoms are
by definition 'schizophrenic,' but no patient is. The same patient may present another
syndrome tomorrow." RocHE, THE CRIMnIA MIND 266 (1958): "The 'product test' is
a subjective determination upon which is pivoted the question of moral responsibility,
i.e. penalty, which the court or jury can and should resolve .... I would submit that if
the product question is withheld from the expert and confined to the triers, psychiatry
can function properly. The jury can decide the matter under applicable law as instructed
by the court, since it is determining a moral (legal) issue in its own terms." See also
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terpretations. Moreover, the essential reason for barring test questions is
that the conclusions are not as important as are the details upon which they
have their basis.
In setting forth guidelines for the psychiatrists, the Washington court
indicated a lack of confidence in the adversary system as a watchdog for
enforcement of its rulings.3 4 The complexity of the insanity issue seems the
primary cause for any failures in the system. Because of his superior insight,
the expert witness can easily become both an advocate and juror. Because
counsel is more interested in the general finding than in the substance of it,
he probably encourages abuses by seeking the best witness rather than the
best expert.3 5
In order to ensure that their directives were implemented, the Washington
court drafted an instruction which was appended to the decision.36 It sum-
marized the salient points made in the decision, advising the psychiatrist of
the kind of testimony he was to provide and the manner in which he was to
present it, cautioning him against unsatisfactory practices. The court indicated
that a copy of this instruction was to accompany all orders requiring mental ex-
aminations and that the instruction was to be read in open court in the
presence of counsel and the jury immediately after the first psychiatric
witness has been qualified. However, Judge Bazelon observed that the in-
struction might not improve the adjudication of criminal irresponsibility and
that this eventuality might necessitate absolute prohibition of the use of legal
labels, a refashioning of the insanity defense, or even abrogation of the de-
fense entirely.
The latter two possibilities raise the undecided substantive issue in Wash-
ington v. United States-whether a determination of criminal responsibility
can be made. Assuming for the moment that it can, consider Judge Bazelon's
suggested refashioning of the insanity defense: "An alternative to Durham-
McDonald would be to make the ultimate test whether or not it is just to
blame the defendant for his act."'37 Judge Fahy touched upon the flaw in this
concept when he stated, "[t]his basic moral decision (on blameworthiness)
is made by society, not by juries. 3 8 To amplify the judge's point, the jurors
are the arbiters of the facts, not of the law. Law is a principle, a rule of
duty, or in this instance, a rule of exculpation. To say that jurors would
Suarez, A Critique of the Psychiatrist's Role as Expert Witness, 12 J. FORENsIc Sci. 172
(1967).
34 Washington v. United States, supra note 16, at 455 n.30.
5 McCormick, supra note 28, at 35.
36 Washington v. United States, supra note 16, at 457-58.
37 Washington v. United States, supra note 16, at 457-58.
38 Washington v. United States, supra note 16, at 462 (Fahy, J., concurring specially in
affirmance).
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determine criminal irresponsibility on the basis of whether defendant is
blameworthy is to say they would make their determination on the basis of
what each thinks the law is (e.g., some would apply the equivalent of the
M'Naghten test, while others of deterministic bent might excuse defendant in
any case).
Refashioning the test instead of the defense (although the court did not
suggest this) would serve no purpose. The principal existing tests (i.e.,
Durham-McDonald, American Law Institute, M'Naghten- "Irresistible Im-
pulse") are essentially the same in that they seek the same result of excusing
those who commit criminal acts without having the requisite mental intent.
The ALI and M'Naghten tests only seem more normative because they are
expressed in terms of symptoms. The symptoms, however, add nothing in
terms of utility and detract from the equal application of the criminal law
in that persons lacking criminal intent could yet be found guilty should the
tests be strictly construed and applied. Durham, on the other hand, is not
nearly as clinically oriented as it appears. This is especially true since the
McDonald and Washington decisions. To determine that the alleged offense
was a "product" of some "mental disease or defect" which "substantially
affects mental or emotional processes and substantially impairs behavior con-
trols" is not any less an abstract value judgment than to determine that
defendant "did not know the nature and quality of his act" or was affected
by an "irresistible impulse."
Regarding all of the standards, they seem no more than imperfect versions
of the obverse of the general principle underlying our criminal law-that
men are criminally responsible for those acts which violate the law and are
committed with evil intent and of their own free will.
The subjectivization necessary to use such a principle when insanity is the
defense seems an inevitably frustrating endeavor. The problem is that the
facts giving rise to the legal principle are incapable of concrete determina-
tion.39 As Justice Marshall recently stated in Powell v. Texas,40 where the
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction for public drunkeness of one who was
to some degree compelled to drink:
It is one thing to say that if a man is deprived of alcohol his hands will begin to
shake, he will suffer agonizing pains and ultimately he will have hallucinations; it
is quite another to say that a man has a "compulsion" to take a drink, but that
39 This same problem destroys the court's attempted analogy between the conclusory
'legal labels of "mental disease or defect" and "negligence" in footnote 28. Washington v.
United States, supra note 16, at 454. The court correctly observed that the labels need
not in themselves provide guidance to the jury. The conclusions are based on other
considerations. But it is here where the problem arises. With "negligence," the facts giving
rise to the conclusion are capable of concrete determination. But the same is not true
with "mental disease or defect."
40 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
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he also retains a certain amount of "free will" with which to resist. It is simply
impossible, in the present state of our knowledge, to ascribe a useful meaning to
the latter statement. This definitional confusion reflects, of course, not merely the
underdeveloped state of the psychiatric art but also the conceptual difficulties
inevitably attendant upon the importation of scientific and medical models into a
legal system generally predicated upon a different set of assumptions.
41
The reasoning of the decision seems more ascribable to the insanity defense.
In fact, Justice Marshall cited the Washington decision in support of his
statement. In concurring, Justice Black also cited the Washington case, and
made the following point:
Almost all of the traditional purposes of the criminal law can be significantly
served by punishing the person who in fact committed the proscribed act, with-
out regard to whether his action was "compelled" by some elusive "irresponsible"
aspect of his personality . . . . Punishment of such a defendant can clearly be
justified in terms of deterrence, isolation, and treatment. On the other hand, medical
decisions concerning the use of a term such as "disease" or "volition," based as they
are on the clinical problem of diagnosis and treatment, bear no necessary cor-
respondence to the legal decision whether the overall objectives of the criminal
law can be furthered by imposing punishment. 42
Judge Bazelon's last suggested alternative, elimination of the insanity defense,
would seem, therefore, to merit consideration.
Expanding upon the points raised by Justice Black, in the realm of be-
havioral science, categorization of abnormality has as its purpose the sugges-
tion of some dispositional treatment. Such diagnosis has no necessary relevancy
to a determination of criminal responsibility. However, in the legal realm, cate-
gorization has as its primary purpose the determination of criminal responsi-
bility. Disposition is only considered after the criminal responsibility question
has been resolved.43 As has been discussed previously though, the diagnostic
fact determination for establishment of mens rea seems an impossible one. It
is plausible then, that society's interests would be better served by excluding
considerations of mental illness prior to the dispositional stage of the pro-
ceeding.44
Thus, the Washington decision is perhaps more important for the issues
raised than those resolved. Judge Bazelon's remarks concerning a refashioning
or abolition of the insanity defense should not be summarily dismissed as
4 1 Id. at 526.
42 Id. at 540-41 (Black, J., concurring).
4 3 See Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 1448 (1956).
44 See Weintraub, Criminal Responsibility: Psychiatry Alone Cannot Determine It, 49
A.B.A.J. 1075 (1963): "My thesis is that insanity should have nothing to do with the
adjudication of guilt, but rather should bear only upon the disposition of the offender
after conviction, and that the contest among M'Naghten and its competitors is a struggle
over irrelevancy."
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obiter dicta. Read in conjuction with the opinions in Powell v. Texas, such
comments may indicate the advent of new developments in the area of
criminal law. Nonetheless, conceding the existence of the insanity defense,
the decision of the Washington court ranks as a needed reform measure. 45
Matthias Lydon
45 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted the Washington court's reasoning
insofar as the governing of psychiatric expert opinion testimony is concerned in United
States v. Wilson, 399 F.2d 459 (4th Cir. 1968) and United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d
920 (4th Cir. 1968).
LANDLORD-TENANT-BREACH OF COVENANT TO
REPAIR-RECOVERY OF CONSEQUENTIAL
DAMAGES: THE RESTATEMENT RULE
AS THE TENANT'S WEAPON
Prior to signing a lease for a house, Meda and Joe Reitmeyer obtained
from Harold Sprecher, their prospective landlord, an oral promise that he
would either repair or provide materials for the repair of a certain obvious
defect. The defect was in the rear porch of the demised dwelling and consisted
of loose or missing wood in the porch floor. The Reitmeyers occupied the
premises under the lease on August 3, 1965, with knowledge that the defect
had not been repaired. They subsequently gave occasional reminders to
Sprecher concerning his covenant to repair the defect. These reminders were
not heeded. On October 7, 1965, Meda Reitmeyer fell at the point of, and as
a result of, the defective flooring and sustained personal injuries. The
Reitmeyers brought an action against Sprecher in tort for his negligent failure
to repair the defect and sought to recover for the personal injuries suffered
by Mrs. Reitmeyer. Although the cause of action arose from defendant's
breach of his covenant to repair, plaintiffs alleged a tortious failure to per-
form such contract. Hence, the plaintiffs claimed as the basis of their cause
of action the existence of a contract, yet the damages were not for the land-
lord's breach of contract but for his negligence in failing to perform his con-
tractual duties. Nor did the complaint contain any allegations that the de-
fective portion of the dwelling was under the control or in the possession of
the landlord. The house occupied by the Reitmeyers, as entire premises, was
under the complete control and in the possession of the tenant. Since the basis
of the alleged tort liability was the contract, the Reitmeyers contended that
the oral promise was supported by consideration, the consideration being
their having entered into the lease in reasonable reliance upon the promise to
[Vol. XVIII
